We study a pricing problem that is motivated by the following examples. A cloud computing platform such as Amazon EC2 sells virtual machines to clients, each of who needs a di erent number of virtual machine hours. Similarly, cloud storage providers such as Dropbox have customers that require di erent amounts of storage. So ware companies such as Microso sell so ware subscriptions that can have di erent levels of service. e levels could be the number of di erent documents you are allowed to create, or the number of hours you are allowed to use the so ware. Companies like Google and Microso sell API calls to arti cial intelligence so ware such as face recognition, to other so ware developers. Video and mobile games are increasingly designed in such a way that one can pay for be er access to certain features. Spotify and iTunes sell music subscription, and di erent people listen to di erent number of songs in a month. Cellphone service providers like AT&T and Verizon o er cellular phone call minutes and data. People have widely varying amounts of data consumption.
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Pricing is an important component in all these examples. e aim of this paper is to understand how to price such goods, for a monopolist seller who aims to maximize her revenue. e following common features (to a rst degree of approximation) of these examples are crucial for our model. Based on this, we consider the following problem. ere is a single good with multiple units of it for sale. Equivalently, there is a single service with various levels of service. e marginal cost to the seller for procuring another unit of the good is a constant. ere is a population of buyers, each of who has a linear valuation for consuming a number of units of the good, subject to a cap (which we refer to as demand). e type/private information of a buyer is determined by the per-unit valuation and the demand. Buyers try to maximize their utility which is quasi linear, i.e., the valuation minus their payment. e question is what is the revenue maximizing pricing scheme.
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Revenue Maximization; Multidimensional Auctions e standard approach in mechanism design [5] is Bayesian: assume that the types are drawn from a given distribution and nd/characterize the incentive compatible (IC) mechanism that maximizes the expected revenue when the buyer types are drawn from this distribution. e optimization is over randomized mechanisms, which in our case corresponds to pricing lo eries.
It appears that the optimal mechanism is usually randomized for small examples with discrete support. is phenomenon is quite common. While Myerson [5] showed that the optimal mechanism for single dimensional types is deterministic under quite a general assumption about the prior distribution called regularity, even slight multi dimensional generalizations end up in randomized mechanisms as optimal [3] . However, practical considerations force a seller to stick to deterministic e full version of this paper can be found in [2] . is work is supported by the NSF, under grants CCF1408635, CCF0964033, Templeton Foundation grant 3966. Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for pro t or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the rst page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the owner/author(s). Nikhil R. Devanur, Nima Haghpanah, and Christos-Alexandros Psomas mechanisms for the most part. Moreover, the optimal randomized mechanism sometimes doesn't even have a nite description [1] . Hence it is important to understand the structure of the optimal deterministic mechanism. In this paper we o er two insights in this regard.
Our rst contribution is to identify a natural condition that guarantees that the optimal ( randomized) mechanism is deterministic. e condition we need is called decreasing marginal revenue (DMR). Regularity requires that the virtual value function is monotone, or equivalently, that the revenue function is concave in the quantile space. DMR requires that in the value space, the marginal revenue is decreasing or equivalently that revenue function is concave. In other words, a probability distribution with CDF F is DMR, if the function (1 − F ( )), the expected revenue of posting a price , is concave. e condition we need for the optimal pricing to be deterministic is that the marginal distributions for , conditioned on a given demand, are all DMR.
Our rst result implies that the optimal pricing scheme is a price vector, which o ers each number of units for a given price. Our second contribution is to show that the revenue as a function of the price vector is concave, under the same assumption of DMR. is implies that the optimal prices can be found e ciently using the ellipsoid or other cu ing plane methods [4] . Note that DMR is a condition on the marginal distributions of values, and does not immediately imply concavity as a function of the vector of prices.
As a corollary, we obtain that under the DMR assumption, there is an e cient dynamic pricing scheme, de ned as follows. Consider a repeated se ing where in each round τ ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,T }, the seller posts a price vector p τ , a buyer is drawn from a xed distribution, and buys her utility maximizing bundle. e seller does not know the distribution of buyer types, and has to only use the purchase information in previous rounds to set the price. e goal is to approach the optimal revenue as T goes to in nity. Given that the distribution satis es the DMR assumption, our result on the concavity of the revenue curve implies that the average revenue per round converges to the optimal revenue at the rate of pol (n) √ T , where n is the number of units. ese bounds are quite strong, since the best known bounds for the dynamic pricing problem in general scale exponentially in n. e concavity of the revenue function is an assumption o en made to escape this curse of dimensionality [6] ; we show that this assumption can be weakened, from the concavity of the multidimensional function to that of the 1 dimensional revenue functions for each d.
